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Abstract 
Environmental policies often set "relative" or "intensity" emission caps, i.e., emission limits 
proportional to the polluting firm’s output. One of the arguments put forth in favour of 
relative caps is based on the uncertainty on business-as-usual output: if the firm's production 
level is higher than expected, so will be business-as-usual emissions, hence reaching a given 
level of emissions will be more costly than expected. As a consequence, it is argued, a higher 
emission level should be allowed if the production level is more important than expected. We 
assess this argument with a stochastic analytical model featuring two random variables: the 
business-as-usual emission level, proportional to output, and the slope of the marginal 
abatement cost curve. We compare the relative cap to an absolute cap and to a price 
instrument, in terms of welfare impact. It turns out that in most plausible cases, either a price 
instrument or an absolute cap yields a higher expected welfare than a relative cap. 
Quantitatively, the difference in expected welfare is typically very small between the absolute 
and the relative cap but may be significant between the relative cap and the price instrument. 
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1. Introduction* 
Many environmental policies set "relative", "intensity", "specific", "rate-based" or "output-
based" emission caps, i.e., they do not limit the absolute level of polluting emissions but the 
emissions per unit of a firm’s output1. Indeed, most command-and-control regulations are 
closer to relative than to absolute caps and numerous voluntary agreements and emission 
trading schemes around the world set relative emission limits. Furthermore a number of 
researchers have considered greenhouse gas emission caps for developed and/or developing 
countries to replace or complement the absolute caps defined by the Kyoto Protocol. Since 
2002 the unilateral announcement by the U.S. of a relative national CO2 target has further 
stirred the debate on these instruments. One of the main arguments put forward for relative 
caps is that since a higher output entails more emissions, more allowances should be 
distributed to high-output firms, to prevent too high a compliance cost.  
However to our knowledge this argument has never been studied in an elaborate formal 
model. Although some recent papers have compared relative and absolute caps, these analyses 
have been conducted in a deterministic framework. Koutstaal et al. (2002, section 3.3) assert, 
but do not prove, that "the Weitzman theorem, which states that under uncertainty the 
preference for either price control through taxes or quantity control with tradable emission 
permits depends on the relative steepness of the marginal cost and benefit curves, is not 
affected directly if instead of absolute caps, trading with relative caps is analysed", but as we 
demonstrate in the present paper, this statement is not correct. 
                                                 
* For their useful comments, I thank two anonymous referees, Maïa David, Roger Guesnerie, Jean-Charles 
Hourcade, Audrey de Nazelle and participants to the EUREQua environmental economics seminar and to the 
AFSE 2003 congress. I also thank the Institut français de l'énergie for its financial support.  
1 As exemplified by these various wordings, the vocabulary is not completely set. Terms like "performance 
standard" are also utilised. Throughout the present text, we utilise "relative caps" and we do not enter into any 
distinction between these instruments; for such a distinction, see Fisher (2001). Since we assume that the output 
level is not affected by environmental policies, what is important for us is whether the overall cap is fixed 
(absolute cap) or proportional to output (relative cap).  
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Our model builds on the Weitzman (1974) prices vs. quantities model. We enhance it by 
distinguishing two sources of uncertainty on costs: business-as-usual emissions, assumed 
proportional to output, and the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve. The use of such 
uncertainty factors allows us to compare relative emission caps not only to absolute caps but 
also to price instruments (taxes or subsidies). We thus compare three instruments: an absolute 
cap, a relative cap and a price instrument, as regards expected welfare. 
The present article is organised as follows. We first describe existing policy programs based 
on relative caps (section 2), the relevant literature (section 3), our model and main 
assumptions (section 4) and the policy instruments we assess (section 5). We then compare 
these instruments in terms of welfare impact (section 6), and section 7 concludes.  
2. Relative emission caps in practice 
Defined widely enough, a relative cap is by no means a new policy instrument: such caps are 
parts of many command-and-control regulations, voluntary agreements and emission trading 
schemes. 
Many command-and-control regulations worldwide are set in units of pollutants per square 
meter of exhaust fumes or effluent water. Since, for a given installation, the volume of 
exhaust fumes or effluent water is closely linked to output, this kind of cap is closer to a 
"relative" cap than to an "absolute" one. The argument holds also for technology 
prescriptions. 
Let us now turn to voluntary and negotiated agreements. In the Netherlands, long-term 
agreements on energy efficiency, which have been made with industry and other sectors since 
1992, are expressed in energy consumption per physical unit of product. In the U.K., France 
and Germany, voluntary agreements on CO2 include more relative than absolute targets 
(Boemare et al., 2003). In the U.S., in February 2003, the Bush administration announced a 
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series of voluntary global warming agreements with the industry, most of which are expressed 
in greenhouse gas intensity (electric utilities, wood/paper industry, chemical industry, and 
cement industry) or energy intensity (oil and gas industry, iron and steel industry, railroad). 
Only one new pledge of reducing absolute emissions was presented, for auto manufacturing 
plants. Although it is unclear whether or not all these targets are below business as usual 
expected emissions, their existence confirms the prevalence of relative targets in 
environmental regulation. 
Relative emission caps are also used in some emission trading schemes (Boemare and 
Quirion, 2002). The first such scheme has probably been the U.S. phase out of lead in 
gasoline: petroleum refining companies had a target expressed in mass of lead per gallon of 
gasoline sold and could exchange allowances with one another. Since the cap did not define 
the total mass of lead released but the lead/output ratio, this was a relative cap. In the U.K., 
most firms covered by the greenhouse gas emission trading scheme, based on the above-
mentioned voluntary agreements, are covered by relative caps. Lastly, a NOX trading scheme 
based on relative caps will soon be implemented in the Netherlands (Jansen, 2004).  
3. Lessons from existing literature 
Relative caps have been analysed by two strands of literature: one is about intensity emission 
caps for countries (i.e., emissions per unit of GDP) in international agreements, and the 
second deals with relative emission caps on firms or sectors, as exemplified in the above 
section. 
Intensity country caps applied to greenhouse gas emissions have prompted a lively debate, 
generally based on non-formalised analyses. In particular, stochastic modelling has not been 
utilised, although uncertainty is recognised as a key issue by most authors. Since we do not 
focus on greenhouse gas emissions but aim to provide general results, we do not present this 
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discussion further. For a survey of the literature, see Philibert and Pershing (2002: 132-142), 
and for more recent references Ellerman and Sue Wing (2003), Kolstad (2005) and Pizer 
(2003). 
Turning to domestic instruments, the only existing models are deterministic and focus on 
relative targets for individual firms; cf. e.g. Ebert (1998), Fischer (2001) or Koutstaal et al. 
(2002). Our motivation is different: we do not focus on different incentives for individual 
firms but on the welfare impact of various aggregate caps. To keep our analytical model 
tractable, we do not concern ourselves with the mechanisms highlighted by these authors. 
This is not to understate their importance but to disentangle these well-known, deterministic, 
mechanisms from the stochastic mechanisms we identify in the present paper. 
4. Key assumptions and model description 
The key difference between relative and absolute caps when it comes to uncertainty is that 
with the former, regulated entities receive more (less) allowances if their output or GDP is 
higher (lower) than expected. The rationale for this instrument is that a higher output entails 
more emissions, other things being equal, "so that" more allowances should be distributed to 
prevent too high a compliance cost. Industry lobbyists have consistently put this argument 
forward, in particular during the negotiation of the European greenhouse gas allowance-
trading directive. 
To compare in a formal framework relative and absolute caps, we depart from Weitzman's 
model in three ways. First we have to model the uncertainty on business as usual (BaU) 
emissions that we assume linked to output, hence to the quantity of allowances distributed 
under the relative cap. Therefore we distinguish two kinds of cost uncertainty: the level of 
BaU emissions and the marginal cost of abatement for a given rate of abatement. Second, 
because BaU emissions vary, it is more convenient to reason in term of emissions instead of 
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abatement. Third, for the same reason, we cannot rely on local approximations of marginal 
cost and benefit curves around an optimum. We thus end up with the following total 
abatement cost: 
( )
α
α
2
2efTAC −=  (1) 
Hence the marginal abatement cost: 
eff
e
TACMAC α−=∂
∂−= .  (2) 
Where  
• [ ]0,e α∈  is the emission level, 
• 0α >  is a stochastic variable representing both the production level (assumed not affected 
by environmental policies) and the ex post BaU emissions, normalised so that [ ] 1E α = 2, 
•  is a stochastic variable representing uncertainty on the slope of the MAC curve, 
normalised so that 
0f >
[ ] 1E f = . We assume that f and α  are not correlated. 
Note that at BaU ( α=e ), we have 0== TACMAC .  
Equations (1) and (2) imply a normalisation (without loss of generality) of marginal cost and 
emissions: the marginal cost for a complete abatement is normalised to f and BaU emissions 
are normalised to α . 
Total environmental (or external) cost (TEC) is closed to Weitzman’s formulation, but once 
again formulated in emissions, not abatement: 
                                                 
2 This corresponds to "multiplicative" uncertainty as studied, in a Weitzman-like model, by Hoel and Karp 
(2001). However these authors do not provide analytical results (because their dynamic model does not allow for 
them) and do not study a relative quota. Furthermore, their model features only one stochastic variable. 
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2
1 2 2
eTEC b e b= +  (3) 
We set b1<1 to avoid a zero-pollution solution and  as in Weitzman’s model. We do not 
model the uncertainty on the benefit side since it is well known that this uncertainty matters 
only when correlated with abatement cost (Weitzman, 1974, Stavins, 1996). In our model, as 
in these two papers, adding (uncorrelated) uncertainty on benefits does not influence the 
ranking of instruments. 
02 ≥b
For each policy instrument, we then look for the level that minimises the expected total social 
cost (TSC), defined as below: 
( ) 2212 2
f bTSC TAC TEC b f e eα α
⎛= + = + − + +⎜⎝ ⎠2
f ⎞⎟
                                                
 (4) 
5. Three policy instruments 
We compare three policy instruments:  
• Q, an absolute emission cap, as in the U.S. SO2 program;  
• P, a price instrument which may be a tax, a subsidy or a combination of both; 
• R, a “relative” emission cap, i.e., an emission cap proportional to the firm's output. This is 
equivalent to a performance standard limiting the emissions to output ratio. 
As stressed by Weitzman, without uncertainty on the reaction function of the firms (the MAC 
curve) all instruments would yield the same outcome, which would be an optimal solution3. 
If, however, the ex post MAC curve differs from what the regulator expects, the outcome will 
differ among instruments and from the ex post optimum.  
5.1. Absolute quota (Q) 
 
3 Weitzman only studies Q and P, but his argument applies to R as well. 
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With the absolute quota (Q), the authorities set the maximum emission level  which 
minimises the expected total social cost. We then maximise the expected value of TSC (4) 
with respect to e, taking the first order condition, leading to
eˆ
4: 
[ ]α1
1ˆ
2
1
Eb
be +
−=  (5) 
Note that  differs from the emission level which would be allowed without uncertainty. As 
stressed by Hoel and Karp (2001), this is because 
eˆ
α  features "multiplicative" uncertainty. 
Conversely, under an additive uncertainty as in Weitzman (1974), the “certainty equivalence” 
principle applies. Here, in particular,  is lower than without uncertainty. Indeed we know, by 
Jensen’s inequality and the convexity of 1/
eˆ
α  for α >0, that [ ] [ ]1 1/E Eα α> =1. 
The allowance price is, by (2) and (5): 
( ) ( )[ ]( )αα 1
1ˆ
2
1
Eb
fbfep +
−−= . (6) 
5.2. Price instrument (P) 
With the price instrument (P), the authority sets the tax or subsidy level which minimises the 
expected total social cost, knowing that firms will abate emissions so that their MAC will 
equal this price. We then introduce in TSC (4), the emission level e(p) which solves p=MAC, 
we take the expected value of this expression and we maximise with respect to p, taking the 
first-order condition, leading to the optimal emission price: 
( )( ) [ ]
( ) [ ]
2
1 2
22
2
1 1
1 1 1
b b E f
p
b E f E
σ
σ
+ += ⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦

f
                                                
 (7) 
 
4 All demonstrations are available from the author as a Wolfram Mathematica notebook. Hence all results are 
easily replicable. 
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In the above equation, 2σ  is the variance of α . Firms abate emissions until their MAC equals 
p , hence, using (2): 
( ) ( )( ) [ ]( ) [ ]
2
1 2
22
2
1 1
1 1 1
b b E f
e p f
f b E f E
σα
σ
⎛ ⎞+ +⎜= −⎜ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠

f
⎟⎟  (8) 
5.3. Relative cap (R) 
To model the relative cap (R), we have to re-write the model as a function of the emission-
output ratio r:  
er α≡  (9) 
We thus substitute αre =  in (4), take the expected value in the resulting expression and 
maximise with respect to r taking the first-order condition, leading to the optimal ratio :  rˆ
( )1 22
1ˆ
1 1
br
b σ
−= + +  (10) 
The resulting emission level is, by (9) and (10): 
( ) ( )1 22
1ˆ
1 1
be r
b
α σ
−= + +  (11) 
Proposition 1. Without uncertainty on BaU emissions, relative and absolute caps are 
equivalent. 
Proof. Without uncertainty on α , we have 1=α ,  and 02 =σ [ ] 11 =αE . By (5) and (11), 
we then have .  ( )ˆ ˆe e r=
This result is not surprising since the quantity of allowances allocated under R is not modified 
by f but only by α . Without uncertainty on this latter variable the authority will set the same 
emission cap for these two instruments. 
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Proposition 2. Without uncertainty on f the relative cap is equivalent to the price instrument. 
Proof. Without uncertainty on f, we have [ ]21 1f E f E f⎡ ⎤ 1= =⎣ ⎦ = , hence, by (8) and (11), 
. ( ) ( )ˆe p e r=
An intuitive explanation of proposition 2 is that the BaU emission level is a multiplicative 
parameter of the emission level stemming from the optimal application of P and R. For 
example, a doubling of BaU emissions and production leads to a doubling of the allowed 
emission level for a given . Because the MAC curve is linear, the same is true for a given rˆ p . 
Figure 1 below provides a graphical representation of the three instruments under each of the 
two sources of uncertainty. On the left panel, the BaU emission level is higher than expected; 
on the right panel, the slope of the MAC curve is higher than expected. As a result, in both 
cases the ex post MAC curve (dashed line) is above the ex ante one (plain line). As a 
consequence, as indicated by the horizontal and vertical dashed lines, the absolute cap yields 
too low an emission level and the tax too high an emission level, as compared to the ex post 
optimum, defined by the intersection of the ex post MAC curve and the MEB curve. In 
accordance with propositions 1 and 2, the relative cap behaves like the tax on the left panel 
and like the absolute cap on the right panel. 
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Figure 1. Outcome of the three instruments under each source of cost uncertainty  
Left panel: higher than expected BaU emissions ( 1α > ); right panel: higher than expected 
MAC curve slope ( 1f > ) 
eα
b1 
p  
1 
p 
( )ˆp e  
( ) ( )ˆe p e r=eˆ 11E α
−⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
MEB 
optimum ex post 
E[MAC] 
MAC  
1
e
b1
1 
f 
p
( )ˆ ˆe e r=
( )ˆp e
p
( )e p  
6. Is there a room for relative caps? 
We may now look for the instrument which leads to the lowest expected social cost. Let c2 be 
the expected slope of the MAC curve. From (2): 
[ ]
2
1E MACc
e
E α
∂ ⎡ ⎤≡ − = ⎢ ⎥∂ ⎣ ⎦  (12) 
Note that c2 is higher if BaU emissions are uncertain than if they are not, since, as we have 
seen, [ ] 11 >αE . 
From equations (4), (5), (11) et (12), the expected welfare from R is higher than that from Q if 
and only if: 
[ ] 2
2 2
1 1 1E cR Q b
α
2σ σ
− −⇔ < =;  (13) 
Where  is the variance of 2σ α . R thus tends to be preferred to Q if b2 is lower than c2, i.e., if 
the marginal benefit curve is flatter than the expected marginal cost curve. However, both the 
numerator and the denominator of the right-side of the (13) are affected by the uncertainty on 
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α . To go further, we have to specify the probability law of α  by assuming than α  may take, 
with an equal probability, two values, 1+σ  et 1-σ , where ( )0,1σ ∈  is the standard deviation. 
Proposition 3. If the uncertainty on BaU emissions follows a discrete probability law with an 
equal likelihood for its two realisations, the relative cap should be preferred over the absolute 
cap if and only if the expected MAC curve is steeper than the MEB curve.  
Proof. With such a probability law, we have [ ] ( )22 1 1 1c E α σ= = − , hence (13) becomes: 
2 2
1
1 2
R Q b cσ⇔ < =−;  (13') 
We are back to the criterion established by Weitzman (1974) to choose between P and Q 
under additive uncertainty, except that c2 is an uncertain parameter here. Since, without 
uncertainty on f, P and R are equivalent (proposition 2), a corollary of propositions 2 and 3 is 
that Weitzman’s criterion is still valid to choose between P and Q under multiplicative 
uncertainty as we have modelised it for α . 
Let us turn to the choice between relative caps and price instruments. From (4), (5) and (8), 
the relative cap R should be preferred to the price instrument P if and only if: 
[ ] [ ]
[ ]
2
2 22 2
1 11
1 1 1
E f E f
R P b
E f E fσ
⎛ ⎞−⎜⇔ > ⎜+ ⎡ ⎤ −⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
; ⎟⎟  (14) 
From Jensen’s inequality, combined with the convexity of 1/f and of 2f  for , we know 
that the right-hand term of (14) is positive. Neglecting for the moment the quotient in 
brackets, we see that R should be preferred to P if b
0f >
2 is high enough, and that a higher 
uncertainty on α  makes R more interesting when compared to P.  
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To go further, we have to specify the probability law of f. As for α  above, we assumed that f 
may take with an equal probability two values, 1 δ+  and 1 δ− , where  is the 
standard deviation. With such an assumption: 
(0,1δ ∈ )
Proposition 4. If the uncertainty on f follows a discrete probability law with two possible 
realisations of an equal probability, the relative cap tends to be preferred to the price 
instrument if the MEB curve is steeper than the expected MAC curve. If the variance of BaU 
emissions rises, the relative cap becomes more interesting when compared to the price 
instrument. 
Proof. With the probability law we assume, we have [ ] ( )21 1 1E f δ= −  and 
( ) ( )22 21 1 1E f 2δ δ⎡ ⎤ = + −⎣ ⎦ , hence equation (14) can be re-written, using (12):  
2
2
2
2
1
1
bR P
c
σ
σ
−⇔ > +;  (14’) 
Figure 2 below displays, in the (b2/c2, σ ) space, the preferred instrument which yields the 
lowest expected total social cost, by tracing the frontiers of (12’) and (13’). R should be 
preferred between the two curves, P to the left of the decreasing curve and Q to the right of 
the vertical line. 
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Figure 2. Preferred instrument in the parameters space 
 
 
It turns out that for plausible values of the standard deviation, the range of values of b2/c2 for 
which R is the preferred instrument is extremely narrow5. Indeed, with the probability law we 
have assumed, it stems from (12’) and (13’) that even with a standard deviation of one third, 
implying a factor of two between the high and the low scenarios, b2/c2 should be between 0.8 
and 1 for R to be preferred. An even higher gap between the two scenarios seems extremely 
unlikely, except for the very long term, but in the latter case it is possible to change the policy 
instruments and targets across time. For example, if we take the six greenhouse gas “marker 
scenarios” elaborated for the Special report on emission scenarios (SRES) of the IPCC 
(2000), the gap between the highest (A1FI) and the lowest (B2) emission scenarios reaches 
two only in 2050. 
Furthermore, in concrete situations, one can expect either a very steep benefit curve in case of 
an ecological or health-related threshold (water eutrophication for example) or a rather flat 
                                                 
5 Note that the frontier between R and Q is vertical, i.e., the level of uncertainty on BaU emissions does not 
influence the ranking of these two instruments, as soon as there is some uncertainty (otherwise these instruments 
provide an identical output, see proposition 1 above). However the level of uncertainty on BaU emissions 
increases the difference in expected welfare between these instruments (but does not change the sign of this 
difference), see Figure 3 below. 
On the opposite, the level of uncertainty on BaU emissions influences both the ranking and the quantitative 
difference in expected welfare between P and Q. 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
b2ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅc2
0 
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P
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one, if no threshold is identified. An absolute cap would be more appropriate in the former 
case, a price instrument in the latter one. 
Quantitatively, is the difference in expected welfare significant among the instruments? 
Figure 3 below displays the difference in expected welfare between R and Q (left panel) and 
between R and P (right panel), as a percentage of total social cost TSC. In both cases, we took 
b1=0.5, but taking other values for this parameter does not change the results much. The 
horizontal lines display the zero level. 
 
Figure 3. Difference in expected welfare between R and Q (left) and between R and P 
(right), with b1=0.5, in percentage of total social cost 
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7. Conclusions 
We built an analytical stochastic model inspired by Weitzman’s (1974) prices-vs.-quantities 
paper but featuring uncertainty both on business-as-usual emissions and on the slope of the 
marginal abatement cost curve. We compared the expected welfare from three policy 
instruments to reduce polluting emissions: a relative cap, by which the public authority limits 
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the emissions/production ratio, a cap on absolute emissions and a price instrument (a tax, a 
subsidy or a combination of both). 
The ranking of the three instruments depends on two parameters: the relative slope of 
marginal benefit and cost curves, and the level of uncertainty on business-as-usual emissions. 
As in Weitzman’s original model, the absolute cap is the preferred instrument if and only if 
the marginal benefit curve is steeper than the marginal cost curve. If not, the price instrument 
is preferred in most cases, being dominated by the relative cap only if the slope of the 
marginal benefit and cost curves is almost equal, or if the uncertainty level of business-as-
usual emissions is extremely high. For example, with the probability law we assumed (two 
equally likely scenarios), even if the gap between the high and low scenario reaches a factor 
of two, implying an very high uncertainty level, the relative cap is the best instrument only if 
the ratio of the marginal benefit and cost curves is between 0.8 and 1. 
Such a condition seems highly unlikely. In concrete cases, one can expect the marginal 
benefit curve to be either very steep, in case of an ecological or health-related threshold 
(water eutrophication for example), or rather flat, if no threshold is identified. An absolute cap 
should be preferred in the former case, a price instrument in the latter one. 
In most plausible cases, the relative cap is thus dominated either by the absolute cap or by the 
price instrument. To choose between these two instruments, Weitzman’s (1974) criterion, i.e., 
the relative slope of the expected marginal cost and benefit curves, is still relevant. 
Admittedly, if either the price instrument or the absolute cap is not available, implementing a 
relative cap instead of the remaining available instrument may very well enhance expected 
welfare. For example, a number of authors (e.g., Pizer, 1999, or Hoel and Karp, 2001) argue 
that a price instrument is better suited than a quantity one to tackle climate change. However, 
negotiating an international tax may prove even more difficult than negotiating national 
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(absolute or relative) targets. In such a situation, uncertainty does provide a rationale for 
relative caps over absolute ones. This is in line with conclusions reached by several authors in 
a less formal framework (cf. Philibert and Pershing, 2002, and references therein). However a 
better compromise between price and quantity instruments does exist: an absolute cap 
combined with properly defined price cap and price floor yields a higher expected welfare 
than either the price instrument or the absolute cap with neither price cap nor price floor, as 
demonstrated by Robert and Spence (1976). 
Finally, quantitatively, the gap in expected welfare (in percentage of total social cost) between 
relative and absolute caps is very low whatever the parameters. The choice between these 
instruments should thus be driven by other differences than the one we studied here, i.e., the 
way they react to uncertainty: distributional effects, incentives to inter-sectoral substitutions, 
monitoring costs, etc.  
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